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Abstract
We study the transition towards effective payoffs in the prisoner’s dilemma game
on scale-free networks by introducing a normalization parameter guiding the sys-
tem from accumulated payoffs to payoffs normalized with the connectivity of each
agent. We show that during this transition the heterogeneity-based ability of scale-
free networks to facilitate cooperative behavior deteriorates continuously, eventually
collapsing with the results obtained on regular graphs. The strategy donations and
adaptation probabilities of agents with different connectivities are studied. Results
reveal that strategies generally spread from agents with larger towards agents with
smaller degree. However, this strategy adoption flow reverses sharply in the fully
normalized payoff limit. Surprisingly, cooperators occupy the hubs even if the aver-
aged cooperation level due to partly normalized payoffs is moderate.
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1 Introduction
The welfare of a society often demands unselfish behavior of their members.
Although working for the common good via cooperation seems a reasonable
demand in return for a stable and flourishing society, it is often fundamentally
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at odds with the Darwinian principles of evolution suggesting that individuals
should act exclusively so to enhance their own prosperity. While understand-
ing the evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals is a puzzle faced by
scientists across many different fields of research [1], the mathematical frame-
work of choice for addressing the challenge is often the same, namely the evo-
lutionary theory of games [2,3,4,5]. Particularly the prisoner’s dilemma game,
consisting of cooperators and defectors as the two possible strategies, is consid-
ered a paradigm for studying the emergence of cooperation between unrelated
and selfish individuals [6]. The game promises a defecting individual the high-
est income if facing a cooperator. On the other hand, the cumulative income of
two cooperators is higher than that of a cooperator-defector pair, and higher
still than that of two defectors. According to the fundamental principles of
Darwinian selection individuals should decide to defect, which ultimately re-
sults in social poverty. This unadorned scenario is indeed described by the
classical well-mixed prisoner’s dilemma game [3], where cooperators always
die out. However, since cooperative behavior is an underpinning for a success-
ful society, and is thus arguably present in everyday life [7,8], the gap between
the outlined theory and practice is obvious, indeed requiring refinement of the
former.
An important milestone in bridging the gap between the outcomes of the well-
mixed prisoner’s dilemma game and reality was the introduction of spatial
structure and nearest neighbor interactions pioneered by Nowak and May
[9], which enabled the cooperators to form cluster on the spatial grid and
so protect themselves against being exploited by defectors. The conditions
of some biological experiments confirmed this conjecture [10]. However, there
also exist compelling evidences that spatial structure may not necessarily favor
cooperation [11]. Albeit a statement issued for the snowdrift game, in view of
difficulties associated with the payoff rankings in experimental and field work
[12,13], it certainly carries an important message and dictates that the search
for additional cooperation-facilitating mechanisms is necessary.
Indeed, research performed within recent years has made it clear that, besides
spatial extensions and mechanisms such as kin selection, reciprocity, strategic
complexity [14], or asymmetry of learning and teaching activities [15], the spe-
cific topology of agents defining the interactions among them plays a key role in
determining the outcome of the evolutionary process [16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26].
Perhaps most prominently, scale-free (SF) networks [27], previously being
identified as omnipresent in man made and natural systems [28], have been es-
tablished as extremely potent promoters of cooperation in both the prisoner’s
dilemma as well as the snowdrift game [17,19]. In contrast, some works have
shown that the ability of SF networks to promote cooperation disappears
if we apply averaged instead of the more widely used accumulated payoffs
[29,30,31,32]. Moreover, the interplay between the evolution of cooperation as
well as that of the network defining the interactions among agents has also
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received considerable attention [33,34,35,36,37,38], showing specifically that
the evolution of the interaction network might have a beneficial effect on co-
operation, and finally, a widely applicable and simple rule for the evolution
of cooperation on graphs and social networks has been proposed [39]. For a
comprehensive review of the field of research see [40].
In this paper, we wish to elaborate on the prominent role of scale-free net-
works and their ability to promote cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game.
More precisely, we study the transition towards effective payoffs in the pris-
oner’s dilemma game on SF networks, whereby the latter is realized via the
normalization of the payoffs of each agent with its connectivity. In particular,
we introduce a normalization parameter that guides the system continuously
from non-normalized, i.e. absolute, to normalized, i.e. effective, payoffs. A
similar but technically different interpolation formula was recently proposed
also by Tomassini et. al. [30]. However, our goal is not just to demonstrate
deteriorated cooperator successfulness due to payoff normalization, but also to
investigate the activity patterns of players that characterize the correspond-
ing stationary states. For this purpose, we introduce strategy donation and
adaptation probabilities of agents with different connectivities. These quanti-
ties enable us to rigorously identify the direction of the strategy flow. In other
words, they serve to explore typical sources and targets characterizing the
microscopic strategy adaptation process in the stationary state of the game.
We find that cooperator densities of different classes of agents show a relevant
dependence on their degree span, thus segregating the agents in terms of the
underlying network topology. Moreover, we also study the global intensity of
the adaptation process and reveal a resonant-type behavior depending on the
payoff normalization parameter.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the description of
the prisoner’s dilemma game and the summarization of the main mechanism
leading to an enhanced cooperation on SF networks. Also, it features the
introduction of the normalization parameter that is being used to interpolate
between the absolute and normalized payoffs. In Section 3 we present the
results and discuss biological implications of our findings, whereas in the last
Section we summarize our findings and conclude the paper.
2 The Game
We consider an evolutionary two-strategy prisoner’s dilemma game with agents
located on vertices of a scale-free network generated via the celebrated mech-
anism of growth and preferential attachment [27], yielding a scale-free dis-
tribution of their connectivity k. Initially, each vertex x is designated as a
cooperator or defector with equal probability. Next, among all kx neighbors
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of a randomly chosen vertex x one neighbor y is also chosen at random, and
both play one round of the prisoner’s dilemma game with all their neighbors
kx and ky, respectively. Their accumulated payoffs resulting from kx and ky
interactions are stored in Px and Py. Thereby, the payoffs are determined in
accordance with the standard prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix having temp-
tation b, reward 1, and both punishment as well as the suckers payoff 0, where
1 < b < 2 to ensure a proper payoff ranking. Crucially, before attempting
strategy adoptions, the two accumulated payoffs are normalized according to
Pi = αPi + (1− α)
Pi
ki
(1)
where i = x or y and the newly introduced normalization parameter α, oc-
cupying any value from the unit interval, determines exactly to what extent
the payoffs are normalized with the number of interactions from which they
were obtained. Evidently, α = 0 dictates the use of fully normalized, so-called
effective payoffs, whereas α = 1 utilizes absolute, i.e. accumulated, payoffs.
Finally, in the spirit of the numerical implementation of the replicator dy-
namics, only if Py > Px agent x adopts the strategy of y with probability
(Py − Px)/[(1 − α)b + αbkm], where km is the largest of kx and ky. Since the
strategy adoption is attempted only if Py > Px this probability is always be-
tween 0 and 1, thus constituting the uncertainty related to each attempt of the
strategy adoption. An elementary part of the Monte Carlo (MC) algorithm,
identical to the one often employed in population genetics, is thus given by
first randomly choosing a pair of players and letting them both play the game
with all their neighbors, and second, by attempting the strategy adoption only
if Py > Px. In accordance with the random sequential update, each individ-
ual is selected once on average during a particular Monte Carlo step (MCS),
which consists of repeating the elementary part N times corresponding to
all x = 1, . . . , N vertices. Our simulations were performed on populations of
N = 5 ·103 to 5 ·104 agents, whereby the average connectivity of the scale-free
network was always z = 4 as a result of the graph-generating algorithm [27].
The application of the asynchronous MC update scheme diminishes the depen-
dence of the stationary state on the initial distribution of the two strategies
and the realization of the generated SF network [30]. Characteristic quantities,
such as the equilibrium frequencies of cooperators ρC or the strategy adap-
tation probabilities defined below, were evaluated after sufficient transients
ttr ≈ 2 · 10
4 to 105 MCS where the sampling period was two times longer than
ttr. All runs were repeated on 10 to 30 independently generated graphs.
We stress that our study focuses on the dynamical features of the game in
its stationary state because the key mechanism leading to an enhanced co-
operation during transient periods has already been uncovered in previous
works [40,41]. The most important topological feature of a SF network that
promotes cooperation is the high connectedness of the hubs. Starting from
4
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Fig. 1. Temporal evolution of the cooperator density towards its stationary state
for b = 1.5 and α = 1. The arrow marks the time when the last defector hub was
overtaken by a cooperator hub. After this event the whole defecting neighborhood of
the defeated hub imitated the change, resulting in an enhanced level of cooperation.
a random distribution of strategies, all hubs can win over the neighbors be-
cause their hub-specific high connectivity results in large cumulative payoffs.
Therefore the players that are linked to a hub will imitate its strategy, which
eventually results in a cloud of homogeneous strategists around each hub [42].
In the long run, such an evolutionary process strengthens the cooperative
and weakens the defector hubs. In particular, when two competing hubs play,
which happens statistically later due to a small probability of such an event,
the cooperating hub wins [40]. Shortly afterwards, the whole cloud of defectors
that was previously supported by the defeated defector hub adopts the coop-
erative strategy as well, which ultimately results in a substantial increase of
cooperator density on the network. This mechanism is demonstrated in Fig. 1,
where the density of cooperators is plotted as a function of time at b = 1.5
warranting a high level of cooperation in the stationary state. At around 16000
MCS (denoted by an arrow) the last defector hub changes its strategy, which
results in a rapid increase of ρc because shortly afterwards the whole cloud
of defectors gives in to the cooperative strategy as well. The resulting state
proves to be stable, bounding fluctuations of ρc around a fixed steady-state
value.
Before we turn to examining the results, some remarks regarding the motiva-
tion behind the introduction of the normalization parameter α are in order. In
particular, while effective payoffs allow for a better mathematical study of the
dynamics and system-size effects, as well as easier comparisons with analytical
treatments both at the mean-field and pair-approximation level, on the other
hand, absolute payoffs lead to a more exciting interplay of the two strategies
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as then cooperators can dominate not only by clustering (as on regular grids)
but also via the benefits offered by the underlying SF interaction network.
The dichotomy of results obtained via effective (α = 0) and absolute (α = 1)
payoffs dictates the necessity for studying the behavior in-between the two
extremes, and the explicit use of the interpolation formula given by Eq. (1)
enables an elegant accomplishment of this task.
3 Results
We start by examining the impact of α on the equilibrium frequencies of coop-
erators and defectors. Figure 2 summarizes the results, from which it becomes
instantly obvious that as α transits from 1 towards 0, thus gradually introduc-
ing the effective payoffs into the strategy adoption of the employed prisoner’s
dilemma game, the cooperative behavior suffers continuously. In particular,
while the absolute payoffs (α = 1) are able to sustain the domination of co-
operation throughout the whole range of b, the effective payoffs (α = 0) prac-
tically induce an extinction of the cooperative trait for all b > 1.2. In fact,
results for α = 0 are quite similar to the ones obtained for regular graphs with
nearest neighbor interactions [17], thus suggesting that the effective payoffs
eliminate the advantage of cooperators given to them by the heterogeneity of
the SF network [31]. We should mention that in [30] a qualitatively identical
result was reported, albeit by using a slightly different interpolation formula.
Although it seems very inviting to conclude that the normalization of pay-
offs via α simply eliminates the advantage of cooperator hubs given by their
large number of links, arguably found crucial for the dissemination of coop-
erative behavior [17,40], the dynamics behind results presented in Fig. 2 is
in fact more subtle. To elaborate on this fact we first introduce the quantity
χ = ρcl/ρC , where ρcl is the fraction of directed links ending at a cooperator.
Although ρcl ≈ ρC by absorbing states, this is not necessarily true by mixed
states. In particular, we argue that by mixed states χ provides complementary
information about which strategy occupies the main hubs of the SF network.
More precisely, ρcl > ρC suggests that cooperators are residing on vertices
with a larger number of links than defectors. Thus, values of χ > 1 are a
sufficient condition for the fact that hubs are predominantly occupied by the
cooperative strategy. On the other hand, χ = 1 indicates that the system is
either in an absorbing state (which is trivially true), or more interestingly, that
neither of the two strategies succeed in predominantly occupying the hubs of
the network by mixed states. Results in Fig. 3 confirm this interpretation of χ
since the value stays close to 1 as long as the stationary state remains predom-
inantly cooperative. Strikingly though, χ raises when ρC decreases, signaling
that the hubs remain predominantly occupied by cooperators despite the fact
that values of α close to 0 introduce effective payoffs that diminish the advan-
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Fig. 2. Fraction of cooperators ρC in dependence on b and the normalization pa-
rameter α. Evidently, ρC decreases continuously for all values of b as α tends to 0.
Employed parameter values were: N = 104, ttr = 10
5, and the results were averaged
over 30 different realizations of the underlying scale-free network.
tage of multiple connections. Naturally, when the majority of agents adopts
the defecting strategy the hubs change their strategy as well, and thus χ again
quickly converges to 1. Nonetheless, results for values of α close to 0 reveal
that hubs are occupied by cooperators despite the apparent dismissal of their
advantage that is implied by the normalization of the accumulated payoffs
with the number of interaction from which they were obtained [43].
Our conjecture can be additionally strengthened by studying ρC for different
classes of agents depending on their connectivity k. For this purpose, we divide
the agents into three categories such that the connectivity span belonging to
each group is equally large on the logarithmic scale. The fraction of cooperators
in the group with the largest, medium, and the smallest connectivity is denoted
by ρLC , ρ
M
C , and ρ
S
C , respectively. Results presented in Fig. 4 clearly show that
the main hubs are actually the ones that remain occupied by cooperators the
longest as α decreases towards 0, while in fact ρMC , and even more so ρ
S
C ,
start to deteriorate substantially sooner. In sum, results presented in Figs. 3
and 4 clearly demonstrate that, in contradiction with the intuitive reasoning,
hubs remain occupied by cooperators until the actual α = 0 limit is reached,
despite the fact that even for values of α close to 0 virtually effective payoffs
are governing the strategy adoption process of the game. In other words, even a
tiny benefit originating from the larger number of links suffices for cooperators
to invade the hubs.
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Fig. 3. Ratio χ between the fractions of links that point to cooperators ρcl and
nodes occupied by cooperators ρC in dependence on the normalization parameter
α by b = 1.5 (dashed line). Solid line shows the decrease of the level of cooperation.
These results suggest that hubs remain occupied by cooperators almost for all values
of α.
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Fig. 4. Fractions of nodes that are occupied by cooperators, depending on their
connectivity k, as a function of α by b = 1.5. Results are presented separately for
three connectivity classes, later being small (S - dotted line), medium (M - dashed
line), and large (L - solid line). Cumulative values of ρC displayed in Fig. 3 are close
to the values depicted by the S curve.
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Fig. 5. The probability of strategy donations Pd (solid lines) and adaptations Pa
(dashed lines) in dependence on the connectivity of agents k. Values on the horizon-
tal axis, running from 1 to 100, correspond to the minimal and maximal connectiv-
ity, respectively. The steady-state activity patterns are shown for four representative
values of α, all obtained by b = 1.5.
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Fig. 6. Comparative plots of strategy adaptation probabilities of agents with degree
k by different values of α. Curves characterize possible targets of strategy adapta-
tion.
To get a deeper understanding of the presented results, we further investi-
gate the microscopic mechanism behind the deterioration of the cooperation-
facilitating effect of SF networks as α → 0. Therefore, we study the strategy
adoption process of agents with different connectivity, thereby providing in-
sights into the dynamics leading to the characteristic properties of stationary
states. For this purpose we calculate the probability Pa(k) that an agent with
connectivity k will adopt the strategy of its neighbor. This quantity character-
izes the potential targets of the invasion process. To identify possible sources
we also introduce Pd(k), which is the probability that an agent with connec-
tivity k will pass (donate) the strategy to its neighbor during an elementary
process. Figure 5 illustrates the introduced probability distributions for dif-
ferent values of α. In case of accumulated payoffs (α = 1) the strategies of
agents with midddle and high connectivity are practically frozen. They can-
not change but are only able to spread their strategies to agents that have
fewer links. In the opposite limit (α = 0), when effective payoffs apply, only
agents with small connectivity can donate their strategy to other agents. The
comparisons of Pa and Pd distributions reveal that the direction of strategy
flow remains unidirectional for all α > 0. The only exception thereby is the
α = 0 case. In sum, strategies generally spread from agents with larger to
agents with smaller connectivity, and moreover, this strategy adoption flow
reverses sharply only in the fully normalized payoff limit.
The comparison of ”target distributions” obtained by different values of α
presented in Fig. 6 reveals that for α close to 0 hubs change their strategy
far more often than their counterparts by larger values of α. As α increases
towards 1, the bulk of adaptation activity shifts from agents with larger to
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Fig. 7. Comparative plots of strategy donation probabilities of agents with degree k
by different values of α. Curves characterize possible sources of strategy adaptation.
agents with smaller connectivity via an intermediate non-monotonous phase.
We argue that the mutable nature of cooperator hubs, observed for close to
zero values of α, is the main reason for their inability to spread cooperative
behavior, despite the fact that, as suggested by results in Figs. 3 and 4, the
majority of time defectors fail to conquer this prime spots of the network.
Thus, the main mechanism behind the destructive impact of effective payoffs
on the cooperative strategy is not the inability of cooperators to occupy the
main hubs of the network, but rather their inability to permanently sustain
that spots by comparatively (in comparison to results obtained for values of
α close to 1) frequently losing their battles to the defective intruders.
The target and source distributions presented in Figs. 6 and 7 also reveal a
resonant-type increase of the overall adaptation process as we change the value
of α from 1 to 0. This non-monotonous curve, not shown here, can be well
approximated in the mean-field level by the product of the two strategy den-
sities ρCρD. Consequently, in the coexistence phase the stationary state is not
rigid but intensely fluctuates due to frequent strategy adaptations, especially
when ρC is far from the absorbing state.
4 Summary
In sum, we elaborate on the prominent role of scale-free networks and their
ability to promote cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game. We study the
transition towards effective payoffs that is driven via a single normalization pa-
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rameter α. We find that the main mechanism behind the destructive impact of
effective payoffs on the cooperative strategy is not the inability of cooperators
to occupy the main hubs of the network, but rather their inability to perma-
nently sustain that spots by comparatively frequently losing their battles to
the defective intruders. In case of normalized payoffs players having the small-
est connectivity rule the evolution. The careful analysis of strategy donation
and adaptation habits reveals that the flow of strategy transmissions reverses
to the opposite direction instantly even if the payoffs governing the evolution
shift only slightly from the effective towards the absolute case. We find also
that the heterogeneous host network implies heterogeneity of the distribution
of cooperators on nodes that have different connectivity, and moreover, that
cooperators always prefer widely connected nodes (hubs) irrespectively of the
level of payoff efficiency.
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